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checkpoint was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.125  
Relying on the Court’s decision in Edmond, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held the checkpoint to be an unconstitutional 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.126 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, 
distinguishing the Edmond checkpoint from the Lidster 
checkpoint.127  The Court once again purported to focus on the 
purpose of the checkpoint.  The Court reasoned that while the 
purpose of the Edmond checkpoint was to detect whether the 
vehicle occupants were committing a crime, the purpose of the 
Lidster checkpoint was not to determine whether the person 
stopped had committed a crime, but merely to obtain 
information from the public at large about the hit and run.128  
Under this “solicitation of information” reasoning, the Court 
judged the reasonableness of the checkpoint, taking into 
consideration “the gravity of the public concerns served by the 
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advance[d] the public 
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty.”129  Balancing the gravity of the public concern in the 
criminal investigation and the significant advancement of this 
concern against the minimal level of intrusion involved in the 
search, the Court declared the checkpoint to be 
constitutional.130 
While these cases both involved roadway checkpoints, 
taken together, it is possible to gain some insight into the 
Court’s “special needs” analysis.  In contrast to the 
reasonableness inquiry associated with individualized 
suspicion searches, the Court will first examine the purpose of 
the particular search to establish whether the search is one 
that falls under the “special needs” exception.  In making this 
determination, the Court will reject any general law 
enforcement purpose as a legitimate special need; if a general 
law enforcement purpose is involved, individualized suspicion 
is required.  Next, once a search is deemed to involve a special 
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